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I.

INTRODUCTION

Voting is foundational to any democracy. In fact, “[v]oting provides
citizens with an opportunity to make public decisions about policies that can
impact their quality of life.” 1 Thus, when the government denies specific
subsets of the population the right to vote, it “becomes less democratic.” 2 In
the United States, the federal government permits states to disenfranchise
people based on mental capacity. 3 This Article will analyze the extent of
disenfranchisement for those with diminished mental capacity (“DMC”) in
the United States, 4 including the variance in treatment among states, 5 and it
will recommend how states should amend their laws to re-enfranchise
people with DMC as they are wrongly denied this aspect of citizenship,
which further perpetuates mental health stigma. 6 Given that citizens with
DMC are wrongly being denied the right to vote, as described throughout
this Article, state courts should adopt the model proposed by the American
Bar Association (“ABA”) absent its third criterion regarding desire to vote.7
Section I of this Article serves as the introduction. Section II describes
the various terminology that has been used regarding mental capacity and
provides a basis of understanding for terms that are used throughout this
Article. 8 Section III discusses the demographics of those impacted by
disenfranchisement and why voting rights for this group should be
protected. 9 Section IV gives a brief overview of the federal laws that are
implicated when disenfranchising people with DMC. 10 Section V discusses
the categories of state laws that disenfranchise those with DMC and the
several states that have chosen not to disenfranchise this group. 11
Martin Agran, William MacLean & Katherine Ann Kitchen Andren, “I Never Thought
About It”: Teaching People with Intellectual Disability to Vote, 50 EDUC. & TRAINING IN

1

AUTISM & DEV’L DISABILITIES 388, 388 (2015).
Id. at 388–89 (noting that in electoral democracies, individual citizens are recognized based
on their vote or ability to vote).
Jason H. Karlawish, Richard J. Bonnie, Paul S. Appelbaum, Constantine Lyketsos, Bryan
James, David Knopman, Christopher Patusky, Rosalie A. Kane & Pamela S. Karlan,
Addressing the Ethical, Legal, and Social Issues Raised by Voting by Persons with Dementia,
292 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1345, 1346 (2004). This discretion is in addition to voter
qualifications based on residency, citizenship, and criminal record. Id.
See discussion infra Parts III–IV.
See discussion infra Part V.
See discussion infra Part VI–IX.
See discussion infra Section IX.A.
See discussion infra Part II.
See discussion infra Part III.
See discussion infra Part IV.
See discussion infra Part V.
2

3

4
5
6
7
8
9

10
11
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Furthermore, Section VI briefly discusses how other electoral
democracies around the world address voting rights for people with DMC. 12
Section VII discusses the scope of the disenfranchisement of people with
DMC by initially looking at when these laws first began in American
history. 13 Then the rationales for disenfranchisement will be discussed,
followed by how those rationales manifest in society’s attitudes, which act as
barriers to voting. 14 Finally, this Section debunks society’s purported
rationales and expose their weaknesses, thus prompting necessary
solutions. 15 Section VIII assesses the issues with measuring capacity and
questions whether states should use capacity as a metric at all. 16 Section IX
will discuss various solutions offered by the literature, followed by
recommendations for how states should proceed to bolster
enfranchisement for those with DMC. 17
II.

TERMINOLOGY

There are various terms used to describe mental capacity that can lead
to complications or unclear definitions. For example, in literature there are
terms used often interchangeably, including “cognitive impairment,”
“intellectual disability,” and “mental disability.” 18 This variation is due to the
number of different diagnoses that may apply, the convergence of medical
and legal determinations, and the difficulty in defining capacity.

A. Range of Diagnoses
This Article will use the term diminished mental capacity (“DMC”) to
describe a variety of mental health and medical diagnoses that can result in
reduced mental competence. A court can deem an individual mentally
incompetent to vote due to a wide range of diagnoses. 19 These diagnoses
include: psychiatric diagnoses, like schizophrenia and bipolar disorder;
See discussion infra Part VI.
See discussion infra Part VII.
Id.
Id.
See discussion infra Part VIII.
See discussion infra Part IX.
Charles Kopel, Suffrage for People with Intellectual Disabilities and Mental Illness:
Observations on a Civic Controversy, 17 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 209, 213

12
13
14
15
16
17
18

(2017) (citing various journal articles in which authors use multiple terms interchangeably in
an apparent reference to the same conditions, resulting in confusion to the reader).
Kimberly Leonard, Keeping the ‘Mentally Incompetent’ From Voting, THE ATLANTIC
(Oct. 17, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2012/10/keeping-the-mentallyincompetent-from-voting/263748/ [https://perma.cc/D77S-5YU8] (explaining that a specific
diagnosis does not necessarily mean that a person will automatically lose their right to vote;
however, people can appear in front of a judge for reasons such as being found “not guilty”
by reason of insanity or involuntary hospitalizations, which then could result in the loss of
their voting rights).
19
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intellectual disabilities, which replace “mental retardation” as a diagnosis; 20
developmental disabilities, such as Down Syndrome and autism; and
cognitive impairments, like traumatic brain injuries and dementia. 21
Apart from the wide range of diagnoses, another issue with using
different categories of diagnoses is the variety of presentations that can occur
in a single diagnosis. For example, with intellectual disabilities, there is a
“spectrum of severity, ranging from mild to profound, with mild [cases]
often going undiagnosed in society.” 22 Therefore, it is important to keep in
mind that there is a wide range of medical diagnoses for those with DMC;
each medical diagnosis includes a variety of attributes that may impact one’s
capacity to vote at various points in the spectrum.

B. Medical Versus Legal Determinations
While DMC is a term used to describe a wide variety of people who
may be deemed to have mental incapacity, mental incapacity “is a legal
determination made by a judge.” 23 The distinction is often discussed with
regard to terms being used as a form of medical assessment while capacity
is identified as a legal status. 24 Being deemed mentally incapacitated means
the person is not able to make “specific life decisions,” which can include
handling finances, “entering a contract, making medical decisions or caring
for their children.” 25 The judicial determination of mental incapacitation for
voting purposes is not enshrined in the law, leading to inconsistent
applications. 26
Benjamin O. Hoerner, Note, Unfulfilled Promise: Voting Rights for People with Mental
Disabilities and the Halving of HAVA's Potential, 20 TEX. J. ON C.L.’S & C.R.’S 89, 92

20

(2015).
Leonard, supra note 19.
Hoerner, supra note 20, at 92 (explaining the criteria used to make medical diagnoses
within the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders for intellectual and
cognitive disorders); see generally AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC & STAT. MANUAL
OF MENTAL DISORDERS (5th ed. 2013).
Jennifer A. Okwerekwu, James B. McKenzie, Katherine A. Yates, Renee M. Sorrentino &
Susan Hatters Friedman, Voting by People with Mental Illness, 46 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY
& L. 513, 514 (2018) (distinguishing mental incapacity from labels outside of the legal realm
such as mental disabilities and mental illness). “For example, a person with a mental illness
may have a sudden head injury that results in an inability to perform the minimum
requirements of voting, and could be determined ‘mentally incapacitated’ to vote.” Id.
Ludvig Beckman, The Accuracy of Electoral Regulations: The Case of the Right to Vote
by People with Cognitive Impairments, 13 SOC. POL’Y & SOC’Y 221, 228 (2014) (discussing
the controversy of whether “capacity” and “competency” in legislation can also be
distinguished between the medical and legal spheres and citing to laws in which the legal
capacity of an individual with a cognitive impairment has been determined to indicate their
legal status and not their functional ability).
Leonard, supra note 19.
Dinesh Bhugra, Social Discrimination and Social Justice, 28 INT’L REV. PSYCHIATRY 336,
21
22

23

24

25
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C. Defining Capacity
Capacity “is generally defined as whether the person possesses the
necessary abilities to complete the task.” 27 Accordingly, capacity is “taskspecific,” which means that a person who may not have capacity to pay bills
may still have the capacity to vote. 28 Additionally, capacity can change over
time, meaning that someone who once had the capacity to vote could lose
that capacity as time progresses. 29 For example, one way to define capacity
for voting is illustrated by Australia’s legislation, which states that one must
“understand the nature and significance of elections” in order to vote. 30
However, capacity has not always been defined by ability but rather by
categorical positions, like guardianship, detention, or being judged “insane,”
and some state laws and constitutions still reflect this practice. 31
Because of this wide scope of abilities for people with DMC, some
argue there “is no scientifically determinable point on the spectrum” where
an individual “manifests sufficient capacity.” 32 Thus, the issue regarding the
disenfranchisement of those with DMC must acknowledge the roadblock
presented when coming to a consensus regarding where exactly ability meets
the threshold of capacity.
III.

DEMOGRAPHICS

The National Institute of Mental Health reported that in 2019 there
were over fifty million Americans over age eighteen who were diagnosed
with some form of mental, behavioral, or emotional disorder. 33 Some argue
339 (2016) (discussing how lack of uniform language leads to social discrimination due to
individuals having to interpret terms based on their own ideas or conceptions to how those
terms should be used).
Okwerekwu et al., supra note 23, at 515.
Dinesh Bhugra, Soumitra Pathare, Chetna Gosavi, Antonio Ventriglio, Julio Torales, João
Castaldelli-Maia, Edgardo Juan L. Tolentino, Jr. & Roger Ng, Mental Illness and the Right
to Vote: A Review of Legislation Across the World, 28 INT’L REV. PSYCHIATRY 395, 397–
98 (2016).
27
28

29

Id.

Beckman, supra note 24, at 229.
A person who (a) by reason of being of unsound mind, is incapable of understanding the
nature and significance of enrollment and voting . . . is not entitled to have his or her name
placed on or retained on any Roll or to vote at any Senate election or House of
Representatives election. Id. (citing Commonwealth Electoral Act 1995 (Cth) (Austl.)).
See Sally Balch Hurme & Paul S. Appelbaum, Defining and Assessing Capacity to Vote:
The Effect of Mental Impairment on the Rights of Voters, 38 MCGEORGE L. REV. 931, 960
(2007).
Id. at 962 (noting that a capacity benchmark in policy is just the degree of importance
society assigns the task measured against possible consequences if performance of the task
was by someone without capacity).
Mental
Illness,
NAT’L
INST.
MENTAL
HEALTH,
https://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/statistics/mental-illness [https://perma.cc/N9YR-W78R].
30

31

32

33
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that these Americans have the “ability to be a powerful voting block that can
direct attention to disability issues that affect millions.” 34 This Section will
address the voter turnout amongst those with DMC; 35 the implication for
aging adults specifically, as they are a growing subsect of those with DMC; 36
and why protecting the franchise is important for this group more broadly. 37

A. Voter Turnout
Even for those with DMC who are legally eligible to vote, there is low
voter turnout. Studies show that worldwide, people with DMC vote at a
“reduced rate compared with the general population.” 38 Additionally,
compared with other disability groups, voters with mental disabilities have
the lowest voter turnout at just thirty percent. 39 Scholars note a number of
factors that lead to low voter turnout, such as not being aware of their voting
right, 40 not having the proper identification to vote, 41 and generally not being
encouraged to participate in the electorate. 42 Arguably, if mobilization could
occur for those with DMC, it “could have a dramatic effect on election
outcomes.” 43

B. Aging Adult Population
As people age, new risks emerge for people with DMC. One source
estimates that by 2050 there will be over fifteen million individuals in the
United States with dementia. 44 Additionally, age is a significant risk factor for
dementia, and voting rates in the United States are often highest for those
This statistic is based on the 2019 National Survey on Drug Use and Health conducted by
the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration. Id. However, the survey
did not cover persons who, for an entire year, had no fixed address. Id. Thus, homeless
individuals, for example, were not included in the survey results. Id.
Carli Friedman, “Every Vote Matters”: Experiences of People with Intellectual and
Developmental Disabilities in the 2016 United States General Election, 14 REV. DISABILITY
STUD.: AN INT’L J. 1, 3 (2018).
See discussion infra Section III.A.
See discussion infra Section III.B.
See discussion infra Section III.C.
Agran et al., supra note 1, at 388. For example, two studies conducted after the 2001 and
2005 general elections in Great Britain revealed a forty percent difference in voting between
individuals with intellectual disabilities and the general population. Id.
Hoerner, supra note 20, at 106.
Okwerekwu et al., supra note 23, at 519.
Friedman, supra note 34, at 6.
See id. at 7. Friedman’s study includes a quote from an individual with intellectual and
developmental disabilities describing the staff at his group home as unwilling to drive him to
his polling place because they “didn’t think it was important to [him].” Id.
Agran et al., supra note 1, at 388 (noting this is especially true for elections in which a few
votes in certain districts can change the results).
Karlawish et al., supra note 3, at 1345. Estimates were based off data from the 2000 census.
Id. at 1345 n.5.
34

35
36
37
38

39
40
41
42

43

44
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in the sixty-five to seventy-four age bracket. 45 Further, dementia is a
progressive disease, making it common for individuals with the diagnosis to
gradually require more assistance with their daily living activities. 46 Put
simply, as a subset of the population gets older, “it is likely that proportion
of individuals with mental disabilities will also increase.” 47 Therefore, the
cohort of the aging adult population could very likely lose their capacity to
vote over time. This, in return, could have a significant impact on election
outcomes and democratic participation. Given the growing population of
aging adults, a critical examination of legislation impacting voting rights
based on mental capacity has never been more essential.

C. Importance of the Franchise
While exercising the right to vote, which is significant for everyone in
a democracy, those with DMC face unique challenges. American
disenfranchisement of individuals with DMC implies they are second-class
citizens. 48 Voting is so vital in relation to citizenship that it is even considered
to be “an important part of being acknowledged as a human being and is a
precondition for agency.” 49 Further, it is argued that “exercis[ing] one’s right
to vote is a central marker of citizenship and may play a significant role in
creating an environment that supports recovery.” 50 Allowing those with
DMC to vote provides additional benefits, including the normalization of
mental illness and acceptance by the general public, 51 building a sense of
community, 52 and overcoming social isolation. 53
Furthermore, people with DMC operate as a group with individualized
needs that policy can address and impact. These policies are of particular
concern to those with DMC, and include the funding of community-based
Id. at 1345. According to the Mayo Clinic, age is a significant risk factor that contributes to
dementia,
“especially
after
age
65.”
Dementia,
MAYO
CLINIC,
https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/dementia/symptoms-causes/syc-20352013
[https://perma.cc/4C7R-RYP3].
Id. at 1347.
Hoerner, supra note 20, at 132.
Agran et al., supra note 1, at 389 (citing to low voter turnout as well as the importance of
voting within a democracy).
Sharon Lawn, John McMillan, Z. Comley, Ann Smith & John Brayley, Mental Health
Recovery and Voting: Why Being Treated as a Citizen Matters and How We Can Do It, 21
J. PSYCHIATRIC & MENTAL HEALTH NURSING 289, 290 (2013).
Id. (finding that mental health recovery revolves around agency and one’s personal journey
and how agency often occurs when an individual is maximizing their positive rights).
Jennifer A. Bindel, Note, Equal Protection Jurisprudence and the Voting Rights of Persons
with Diminished Mental Capacities, 65 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 87, 120 (2009). The
ability to vote would “symbolically express affiliation with the broader society,” physically
represent integration of people with diminished mental capacities as part of the broader
community, and move away from the past trends of isolating those individuals from society.
Id. at 119.
See Okwerekwu et al., supra note 23, at 516.
See Kopel, supra note 18, at 229.
45

46
47
48

49

50

51

52
53
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mental health services and employment affirmative action. 54 Such policies,
which clearly impact those with DMC, further support the societal need to
hear the voices of those individuals. 55 When people with DMC are denied
the right to vote, elected officials are more likely to overlook the needs of
those with DMC because they are not seen as part of their constituency. 56
Therefore, enfranchisement for those with DMC acts as an important
symbol of societal inclusion and allows for the influence of policies that
directly impact their specific needs through the expressive act of voting.
IV.

FEDERAL LAWS

At the federal level, enfranchisement protections for those with DMC
stem from the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution
and various legislation passed by Congress. 57 While states have the authority
“to define voter qualifications relating to residency, citizenship, criminal
record, and mental capacity,” 58 all states must abide by constitutional
limitations. Additionally, Congress may impose “time, place, and manner”
regulations for federal elections. 59

A. The United States Constitution
First, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
dictates that “[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.” 60 Therefore, under the Equal Protection
Clause, voters with DMC who otherwise meet the age and residency
requirements “cannot be treated differently from other such voters” based
on the fact that they have DMC or other such statuses, like guardianship. 61
Second, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states,
“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
Bhugra et al., supra note 28, at 399 (noting the lack of funding for community mental health
services in many states and localities).
Agran et al., supra note 1, at 395 (indicating the policy decisions surrounding mental health
that are often being made without input from the community directly impacted).
Bhugra et al., supra note 28, at 399 (“If persons with mental health problems had the right
to vote, politicians are likely to be interested in addressing their concerns.”).
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
Karlawish et al., supra note 3, at 1346.
Naomi Doraisamy, Out of Mind, Out of Sight: Voting Restrictions Based on Mental
Competency, 56 IDAHO L. REV. 135, 153 (2020) (citing to U.S. CONST. art I, § 4, which
states the following: “The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and
Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress
may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations . . .”).
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
JUDGE DAVID L. BAZELON CTR. FOR MENTAL HEALTH L., ET AL, VOTE. IT’S YOUR
RIGHT: A GUIDE TO THE VOTING RIGHTS OF PEOPLE WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES 1, 6
(2020), http://www.bazelon.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/Bazelon-2020-Voter-GuideFull.pdf [https://perma.cc/J6ZS-KHHK] [hereinafter BAZELON].
54

55

56

57
58
59

60
61
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due process of law . . . .” 62 This constitutional provision is especially
important given that the legal designation of “mentally incapacitated”
requires a judicial determination; therefore, due process must be met in
accordance with the Due Process Clause. 63 Additionally, due process might
be in question if a person’s right to vote is taken away through involuntary
hospitalization or appointment of a court-ordered guardian, and the
individual was not able to specifically challenge the potential loss of their
right to vote. 64
Because of these two constitutional provisions, heightened scrutiny is
triggered, meaning that states must be able to adequately justify the
disenfranchisement in order “to satisfy the rigors of the Equal Protection
Clause and the procedural protections required for due process.” 65

B. Congressional Legislation
Various legislation has been passed that impacts people with DMC’s
ability to vote. The legislation includes the Voting Rights Act (“VRA”), the
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), the Help America Vote Act
(“HAVA”), the Rehabilitation Act, and the National Voter Registration Act
(“NVRA”). 66 However, it should be noted that these laws are often criticized
for readily protecting the right to vote for those with physical disabilities
while “failing to consider the voting rights of persons with mental
disabilities,” 67 and the laws reflect the unwillingness of members of Congress
to expressly include those with DMC as part of their constituencies. 68
Under the VRA, literacy tests were banned, and the statute further
reaffirms the principle that people with DMC cannot be treated differently
based on their ability to complete a test. 69 And the ADA prohibits public
entities “from excluding qualified people from voting based on disability if
they meet the essential requirements for voting.” 70 Additionally, an
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
Doraisamy, supra note 59, at 147–48.
BAZELON, supra note 61, at 7.
Doraisamy, supra note 59, at 148 (referring to the narrow tailoring standard the Supreme
Court established when addressing the infringement on a fundamental right).
See generally Voting Rights Act of 1965, 52 U.S.C. § 10101; Americans with Disabilities
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101; Help America Vote Act of 2002, 52 U.S.C. § 20901 [hereinafter
HAVA]; Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701; National Voter Registration Act of
1993, 52 U.S.C. § 20501.
Hoerner, supra note 20, at 105 (discussing HAVA’s particularized attention to physical
accessibility, especially for those with visual impairments that proved successful for this
subgroup’s voting ability. But the law did not help establish standards for the much broader
disability community that would improve access to the polls).
See Kay Schriner & Lisa Ochs, “No Right is More Precious”: Voting Rights and People
with Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities, 11 RSCH. & TRAINING CTR. ON CMTY.
LIVING, UNIV. MINN. 1, 4–5 (2000).
Okwerekwu et al., supra note 23, at 514 (citing 52 U.S.C. § 10301).
BAZELON, supra note 61, at 8 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–213).
62
63
64
65

66

67

68

69
70
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individualized assessment is required before a public entity can exclude a
voter based on disability under the ADA. 71 Under HAVA, “a person whose
eligibility to vote is in doubt” is entitled “to cast a provisional ballot.” 72
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act “prohibits disability-based
discrimination in programs or activities that receive federal financial
assistance.” 73 Finally, the NVRA allows for legal disenfranchisement of those
with DMC by explicitly permitting states to “enact laws authorizing removal
of voters from the registration rolls based on ‘mental incapacity.’” 74
V.

STATE LAWS

As indicated above, states are able to define voter qualifications with
regard to mental capacity. 75 Because of this, states differ in criteria and use
differing language that ultimately denies the franchise to those with DMC.
For example, several state constitutions and state laws use outdated and
stigmatizing terms. Some state provisions focus on the guardianship process;
some states rely only on court determinations; and others use a combination
of these tactics. 76 There are also a number of states that have chosen not to
impose restrictions on voting with regard to mental capacity. 77

A. State Laws with Outdated and Stigmatizing Language
Eleven states use outdated terms, including “idiots, insane persons,
and non compos mentis.” 78 Non compos mentis is a Latin term that means

71
72
73
74

Id.
Id. at 10 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 15301–523).
Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 794(a)).
Id. at 12 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973gg–1973gg-10 (since recodified at 52 U.S.C. §§ 20501–

11)).
Karlawish et al., supra note 3, at 1346.
See Doe v. Rowe, 156 F. Supp. 2d 35 (D. Me. 2001) (noting Maine’s statute preventing
individuals who were “under guardianship for reasons of mental illness” from registering to
vote and voting was impermissibly broad); The Right to Vote, DISABILITY JUST.,
https://disabilityjustice.org/right-to-vote/ [https://perma.cc/AGN5-GD9E] (providing seven
states deny the right to vote to “idiots or insane persons"); BAZELON, supra note 61, at 14
(highlighting the use of outdated language present in state regulations regarding voting rights).
See Matt Vasilogambros, Thousands Lose Right to Vote Under ‘Incompetence’ Laws, PEW
(Mar.
21,
2018),
https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-andanalysis/blogs/stateline/2018/03/21/thousands-lose-right-to-vote-under-incompetence-laws
[https://perma.cc/T6L3-NZK4] (providing a list of eleven states that do not restrict voting
rights based on mental capacity); Guardianship, Mental Incapacity and the Right to Vote,
SPECIAL NEEDS ANSWERS (Oct. 16, 2017), https://specialneedsanswers.com/guardianshipmental-incapacity-and-the-right-to-vote-16317 [https://perma.cc/2NLH-MAGX] (providing
there are eleven states that do not restrict voting rights based on disabilities).
Okwerekwu et al., supra note 23, at 514. These states include Alaska, Arizona, Hawaii,
Kentucky, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Ohio, and Rhode
Island. See BAZELON, supra note 61, at 14.
75
76

77

78
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“not master of one’s mind.” 79 This Latin phrase is used by four states
(Hawaii, Massachusetts, Nebraska, and, Rhode Island), but it “has been
interpreted differently from state to state.” 80 Other derogatory terms like
“idiots,” “insane persons,” and “of unsound mind” are found to be
stigmatizing and “virtually impossible to understand and apply.” 81 Further,
these blanket terms “do not reflect the nuance” and spectrum that covers
individuals with DMC. 82 The outdated and stigmatizing language used by
various states creates a damaging rhetoric pertaining to individuals with
DMC.

B. Guardianship Determinations
Thirteen states “bar voting by individuals who are ‘under
guardianship.’” 83 Guardianship proceedings are “the state court process by
which someone is determined to be so incapacitated or mentally disabled
that it is necessary to remove their rights to make some or all decisions about
their person or property and delegate that decision-making authority to
another person or entity.” 84 However, states have different definitions of
“who is an incapacitated person,” 85 resulting in situations where a person
with DMC could be appointed a guardian in one state but not in another
under the same circumstances. 86 Of particular concern is that guardianship
Bindel, supra note 51, at 95 (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004)).
BAZELON, supra note 61, at 14. Nebraska defines this phrase to mean “mentally
incompetent.” Id. at 14 n.47 (citing NEB. REV. STAT. § 32-312). In Hawaii, “a person may
be disenfranchised on competence grounds only if determined to lack capacity to vote” while
not actually providing a definition for the term non compos mentis. Id. (citing HAW. REV.
STAT. § 11-23(a)). Rhode Island also does not define the term, but the state’s election board
has held that voters shall not be purged from voter rolls based on a finding of not guilty by
reason of insanity in a prior criminal proceeding. Id. Mississippi law does not provide a
definition for the term but has distinguished it from persons with mental illness and persons
with intellectual disabilities. Id. (citing MISS. CODE ANN. § 1-3-57).
Id. at 14.
Hoerner, supra note 20, at 112.
BAZELON, supra note 61, at 13. These states include Alabama, Arizona, Louisiana,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Utah, Virginia, and West Virginia. Id. at 13 n.45.
Hurme & Appelbaum, supra note 31, at 946.
Id. at 948. Some examples include one who “lacks sufficient understanding or capacity to
make or communicate responsible decisions” or who “is in danger of substantially
endangering the person’s own health, or of becoming subject to abuse by other persons or
of becoming the victim of designing persons.” Id. at 948–49.
See generally Transferring Guardianship Across State Lines, SPECIAL NEEDS ALLIANCE
(Oct.
2016),
https://www.specialneedsalliance.org/the-voice/transferring-guardianshipacross-state-lines/ [https://perma.cc/8VGE-A7CX] (acknowledging “laws between the states
can vary considerably” and the difference in requirements for guardianship makes
transferring guardianship between states difficult as the new home state may not grant the
guardianship due to a difference in regulations). This indicates the differences in regulations
between states mean that guardianship could be granted in one state and not another.
79
80

81
82
83

84
85
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proceedings “rarely include inquiries into a person’s understanding of
voting issues.” 87 This is often a result when the person with DMC and the
person seeking guardianship are unaware that voting rights might be lost as
a consequence of appointment. 88
Even when voting rights are addressed in a guardianship hearing, some
states require stricter inquiries for those with DMC to demonstrate their
understanding of the voting process because each state can have differing
procedures. 89 One example is a judge asking a person with DMC at a
guardianship hearing “to provide the names of various federal, state, or local
office holders, to explain the voting process, and to explain their political
views.” 90 This arguably imposes greater expectations on those with DMC
than of the general public. 91

C. General Court Determinations
Twenty-two states and the District of Columbia have “laws that bar
voting only if a court has determined that an individual specifically lacks the
capacity to vote.” 92 Some of these states bar voting for people with DMC
when a court judges them “mentally incompetent,” but “other states require
that judges specifically revoke voting rights” in order for disenfranchisement
to occur. 93 However, just like with guardianship proceedings, judicial
discretion can result in different standards depending on the jurisdiction.
There appear to be only four states that “give specific statutory
direction as to what a judge is to consider when determining whether a
person is ineligible to vote.” 94 Delaware requires a finding of “severe
cognitive impairment which precludes exercise of basic voting judgement”
by clear and convincing evidence. 95 Iowa courts must determine a person
“lacks sufficient mental capacity to comprehend and exercise the right to
vote.” 96 In Washington, the court must clarify whether the appointment of a
guardian limits that individual’s right to vote and if so, state findings must
BAZELON, supra note 61, at 13.
Id. at 18. Challenging this type of ruling might have other collateral consequences. For
instance, if a person “request[s] that the probate judge determine his competence to vote [it]
may be viewed as concession that the state law allows individuals under guardianship to retain
their voting rights,” thereby hindering their ability to challenge the state law itself. Id. at 18
n.59.
Id. at 19.
87
88

89
90
91
92

Id.
Id.
Id. at 13. These states include Alaska, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware,

Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Maine, Nevada, New Jersey, New
Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Texas, Washington, Wisconsin, and
Wyoming. Id. at 13 n.46.
Leonard, supra note 19.
Hurme & Appelbaum, supra note 31, at 957.
Id. (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 1701 (2006)).
Id. (citing IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.556(1) (2020)).
93
94
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“support removing that right . . . includ[ing] a finding that the adult cannot
communicate, with or without support, a specific desire to participate in the
voting process.” 97 Finally, in Wisconsin, a court must determine whether an
individual “is incapable of understanding the objective of the elective
process.” 98
While judges must apply these arguably vague and arduous terms, their
decisions are often complicated when there is an apparent conflict between
a state’s constitution and legislation. For example, Minnesota’s constitution
appears to provide that those “under guardianship cannot vote,” while
statutes in Minnesota indicate that “people under guardianship retain the
right to vote, unless the guardianship order takes it away.” 99 Thus, without
clear standards in place, judicial decision-making is required to make sense
of the contradictions, giving courts considerable discretion.

D. States Without Mental Capacity Restrictions
While states are allowed to impose voting restrictions for those with
DMC, ten states have chosen not to impose voting restrictions and therefore
have no mental capacity limitations: Colorado, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana,
Kansas, Michigan, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and
Vermont. 100 However, the Kansas and Michigan state constitutions “give the
legislature the authority to bar citizens from voting because of mental illness
or mental incompetence,” but their states have never passed legislations that
would accomplish this. 101
VI.

INTERNATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

The issue of whether to bar those with DMC from voting is not unique
to the United States. In fact, countries with electoral democracies “around
the world have recognized the importance of . . . voting rights” for those
with DMC “and have made strides to protect these rights.” 102
The United Nations’ (“UN”) International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights “protects the right of every citizen to vote ‘without
unreasonable restrictions.’” 103 Additionally, in 2007 the UN held a
Convention on Rights of Persons with Disabilities that aimed to reaffirm the
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 11.130.310(1)(c) (2022).
Hurme & Appelbaum, supra note 31, at 958 (citing WIS. STAT. ANN. § 54.25(2)(c)1.g
(2019)).
Elizabeth R. Schiltz, The Ties That Bind Idiots and Infamous Criminals:
Disenfranchisement of Persons with Cognitive Impairments, 13 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 100,
106–07 (2016) (first citing MINN. CONST. art. VII, § 1; and then citing MINN. STAT. §§
201.014, subdiv. 2(b), 524.5-310, 524.5-120(14) (2010)).
BAZELON, supra note 61, at 14.
Hurme & Appelbaum, supra note 31, at 940.
Okwerekwu et al., supra note 23, at 519.
Id. at 515 (citing the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: General
Assembly of the United Nations, art. 25, 179, 1966 and noting its 169 cosignatory parties).
97
98

99
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right of those with DMC and physical disabilities to participate in the
franchise. 104 Often UN member states were “quick to ratify international
conventions” following the UN conventions with regard to voting rights for
those with DMC but in practice “are extremely slow in ensuring that their
citizens are able to enjoy the rights they have promised.” 105
Of the 193 UN member states, sixty-nine “deny all persons with any
mental health problems a right to vote without any qualifier.” 106 Additionally,
nine member states “disenfranchise people detained under mental health
laws,” and fifty-six member states “authorize courts or magistrates to
disenfranchise people for mental health reasons.” 107
Sixteen UN member countries have no voting rights restrictions for
those with DMC. 108 In Sweden, its governing body granted all individuals
with DMC the right to vote in 1989. 109 Since the change was made, total voter
turnout for Swedish parliamentary elections has remained strong, eighty-six
percent in 1991, and as high as eighty-seven percent in 2018. 110 Given that
these electoral democracies have not ground to a halt by allowing those with
DMC to vote, it calls into question whether an election process is benefited
by disenfranchising this portion of the population.
VII.

SCOPE OF DISENFRANCHISEMENT

A. Historical Context
Further exploration of the impact of disenfranchisement requires an
understanding of both history and scope. In 1819, Maine became the first
state to bar individuals “under guardianship” from voting. 111 Prior to 1820,
only Maine and Vermont had legal barriers to disenfranchise people with
DMC. 112 By 1860, twelve additional states had legislation or language in their
state constitutions to exclude people with DMC from voting. 113 The
prohibition allowing people with DMC to vote coincided with the expansion
104
105

Bhugra et al., supra note 28, at 395.
Id. at 397 (noting that over thirty percent of cosignatory countries continued to deny voting

rights for persons with mental illness and some for even up to a decade later).
Id. at 396.
Kopel, supra note 18, at 246.
Beckman, supra note 24, at 225. These sixteen countries include Austria, Bolivia, Canada,
Croatia, Ecuador, Finland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Kenya, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway,
Slovenia, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Id. at 226.
Anette Kjellberg & Helena Hemmingsson, Citizenship and Voting: Experiences of Persons
with Intellectual Disabilities in Sweden, 10(4) J. POL’Y PRAC. INTELLECTUAL DISABILITIES
326, 331 (2013).
Voter Turnout by Election Type: Sweden, INT’L INST. FOR DEMOCRACY AND ELECTORAL
ASSISTANCE, https://www.idea.int/data-tools/country-view/261/40 [https://perma.cc/9F4HRNED].
Bindel, supra note 51 at 102.
Schriner & Ochs, supra note 68, at 3.
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of voting rights outside of White landowners. 114 Moreover, in order to
further isolate individuals with DMC from society, large institutions or
“insane asylums” were created to isolate people with DMC. 115 The practice
of removing or isolating those with DMC from society is problematic.
However, there are purported reasonings that suggest differently, as
explained below.

B. Rationales for Disenfranchisement
As explained below, the five most prominent rationales for
disenfranchising individuals with DMC include: (1) a paternalistic attitude,
(2) preventing fraud, (3) promoting election legitimacy, (4) promoting an
intelligent electorate, and (5) serving political advantages.
With regard to paternalism, there is a deeply rooted history of
believing that people with DMC are “not morally fit to vote, cannot be
trusted, or are insane.” 116 Children with DMC were believed to be
“uneducable and dangerous.” 117 Moreover, there were general notions of
viewing people with DMC as “undesirables” within society. 118 These archaic
beliefs continued into the early twentieth century, with society looking down
on those with DMC with pity, concern, and fear. 119 Thus, by restricting
people with DMC from voting, the general public was protected from the
results of their choices, 120 while also ensuring that people with DMC could
still be “kept safe and cared for” within institutions outside the
mainstream. 121
Additionally, the institutionalization of people with DMC bolstered the
belief that other people can and should represent their best interests. 122
Many have argued that people with DMC, especially those under
guardianship, have more capable people in their lives who are responsible

Bindel, supra note 51, at 102.
See id. at 106. See also Nicholas F. Brescia, Modernizing State Voting Laws That
Disenfranchise the Mentally Disabled with the Aid of Past Suffrage Movements, 54 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 943, 946 (2010).
Martin Agran & Carolyn Hughes, “You Can’t Vote – You’re Mentally Incompetent”:
Denying Democracy to People with Severe Disabilities, 38 RES. & PRAC. FOR PERSONS WITH
SEVERE DISABILITIES 58, 59 (2013).
Brescia, supra note 115, at 943, 946 (citing to the language used by Justice Marshall in City
of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 461 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) in which he details the history of prejudice for children with
diminished mental capacity).
Doraisamy, supra note 59, at 139–40.
Schriner & Ochs, supra note 68, at 4 (identifying that these notions were coupled with
“social disorder, deviancy, and criminality”).
Bindel, supra note 51, at 105.
Leonard, supra note 19.
Schriner & Ochs, supra note 68, at 4 (describing the viewpoint that it is unnecessary to
allow people with DMC to participate in the electorate).
114
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and thus can politically represent the individual with DMC. 123 Another
modern rationale for disenfranchisement is that people with DMC cannot
consent to contracts. 124 This idea stems from the notion that voting is a social
contract of democratic government. But because the electors have the
power to create financial consequences through taxes, voting is also a
commercial contract. Consequently, it must mean that people with DMC
should be protected from assuming the contractual duties because they lack
the ability to assent. 125 In other words, restricting the voting rights of a person
with DMC is protecting them due to their inability to consent in other
situations.
Another widely used rationale for disenfranchising those with DMC is
preventing fraud or protecting people with DMC from fraud. 126 Similar to
the paternalism argument, the prevention of fraud rationale argues that
voting bans need to be in place so that people with DMC are not taken
advantage of or exploited. 127 Of particular concern is that those who live in
long-term care facilities or other group settings, such as nursing homes, will
be vulnerable to absentee ballot abuse by staff or other deceitful persons. 128
Some residents in such facilities never see their ballot because staff will vote
for them, or if they are given their opportunity to vote, staff do not mail the
ballots. 129 Additionally, many argue that people with DMC are more
susceptible to undue influence. 130 If people with DMC are enfranchised and
persuaded by others, extra votes will be cast in favor of the views of the
influencer. 131 Thus, the reasoning is that society must prohibit those with
DMC from voting, otherwise malicious influencers will ultimately end up
with extra votes.
However, even if votes are not fraudulently cast, some argue that
allowing people with DMC to vote threatens the legitimacy of elections. 132 In
fact, in 2012, a Minnesota district court judge emphasized the importance
of individually identifying competence to vote for each person under
Brescia, supra note 115, at 960–61. Additionally, those with DMC will be able to have
their best interests represented because voters and elected officials will be “motivated by
compassion and sympathy” to do so. Id. at 961.
Id. at 962.
Kopel, supra note 18, at 227.
Brescia, supra note 115, at 964.
Okwerekwu et al., supra note 23, at 516.
See Charles P. Sabatino & Sally Hurme, Who Has the Capacity to Vote?, 19
EXPERIENCE 23, 24 (2009); see also Doraisamy, supra note 59, at 142.
Rabia Belt, Contemporary Voting Rights Controversies Through the Lens of Disability, 68
STAN. L. REV. 1491, 1505–06 (2016).
Doraisamy, supra note 59, at 142. See Okwerekwu et al., supra note 23, at 516 (stating that
undue influence may stem from a desire to please others).
Kopel, supra note 18, at 230 (“Enfranchisement of people with mental impairment thus
allows other people in their lives to quietly appropriate extra votes and obtain outsized
political influence for themselves.”).
Id. at 226.
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guardianship because the court “owes the general electorate at least that
much.” 133 It has been argued that if people with DMC routinely vote, the
general public’s level of seriousness for which they perceive voting would
greatly diminish. 134 Some argue that participation by people with DMC in
the political process undermines the integrity and legitimacy of elections due
to a lack of understanding and appreciation of voting. 135 These beliefs
support the notion that society should prevent incompetently cast ballots
from influencing the results in close elections by disenfranchising those with
DMC. 136
Underlying the concept of incompetent voting is the belief that people
with DMC lack the intelligence required to participate in voting.
Historically, laws disenfranchising people with DMC occurred under the
idea that this subsect of the population was neither morally nor intellectually
capable of voting. 137 The concept of electing representatives was deemed
“too complicated” for individuals who had “simple” or “demented”
minds. 138 Today, there is not a push for enfranchisement because general
consensus is that “the laws are correct,” and that those with DMC should
not participate in democracy due to having their rationality impaired. 139 The
public may believe that in order to vote, one must “retain information, weigh
details, and make calculated decisions,” and people with DMC are viewed
categorically as not being able to do. 140
The final rationale that is mentioned, though not widely cited, is that
disenfranchising people with DMC serves political advantages. 141 The
history of laws disenfranchising people with DMC can also not be
overlooked. The institutionalization of those with DMC took place around
the same time as limitations to their voting rights occurred. 142 Those
institutions could house large numbers of people, thus increasing the
population within the districts they were located. 143 Residents in the district
that house the institution may control the outcomes of elections through the

In re the Guardianship of Erickson, No. 27-GC-PR-09-57, 2012 Minn. Dist. LEXIS 193,
at *30 n.5 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Oct. 4, 2012).
Hurme & Appelbaum, supra note 31, at 964.
Doraisamy, supra note 59, at 145. “[O]vercom[ing] the inertia of a disinterested voter, may
be eroded if the opportunity to vote is not perceived as significant enough, or if their
comparatively ‘more rational’ vote may be canceled by a vote by a mentally incompetent
voter.” Id. at 146.
Hurme & Appelbaum, supra note 31, at 964.
See Hoerner, supra note 20, at 107–08; see also Schriner & Ochs, supra note 68, at 4.
Schriner & Ochs, supra note 68, at 4 (echoing the justifications used between the midnineteenth and early twentieth centuries).
Leonard, supra note 19.
Hoerner, supra note 20, at 108–09.
Bindel, supra note 51, at 105–06.

133

134
135

136
137
138

139
140
141
142
143

Id.
Id.

673

674

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:2

displacing of individuals with DMC into their district. 144 Furthermore,
decreasing the overall electorate has commonly been used as a strategy to
advance political parties. 145 A 2004 study of the voting patterns for
individuals with mental illness in Germany found that those living in
residential facilities had preferences for left-wing candidates. 146 If this
information can be applied to those with DMC in the United States (though
more research is necessarily required), it is possible that right-wing
candidates and supporters are thus benefiting from the disenfranchisement.
Overall, many of the five rationales discussed above parallel the
reasoning for previously disenfranchising other groups, such as women and
Black voters. 147 The intelligent electorate rationale was used as women and
Black people were often categorized as “too unintelligent” to vote. 148
Women were intentionally excluded from democratic participation for
being deemed “more suitable for domestic life than . . . politics,” and it was
best to allow the men in their lives to vote for their best interests. 149 With
regard to political advantage, Black people were excluded from voting
systematically in the South for partisan gain. 150 A sense of paternalism lingers
throughout the rationales used to disenfranchise these aforementioned
groups by the nuanced indication that they are insufficient advocates of their
own needs. 151
144

Id.

Doraisamy, supra note 59, at 139–40. “Originally these exclusions came in the form of
race, gender, and financial or social status restrictions, e.g., property ownership, but as voting
qualifications were increasingly relaxed, states began to specifically target mentally ill persons
or persons under guardianship.” Id. at 139.
Bhugra et al., supra note 28, at 398 (citing Jens Bullenkamp & Burkhard Voges, Voting
Preferences of Outpatients with Chronic Mental Illness in Germany, 55 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS.
1440 (2004)).
See Brescia, supra note 115.
Id. at 954, 960 (discussing the inferior education rationalization for suppressing Black votes
and the historical perception that women were “too uninformed” to engage in politics).
Id. at 958 (drawing comparisons to the isolation women faced in their own homes with the
isolation of those with DMC or severe mental illness within hospitals).
Bindel, supra note 51, at 105. “The constriction of the electorate was notorious in the deep
South, where Democrats successfully excluded African-Americans from voting for decades
in an attempt by one faction of the Party to maintain its dominance over both the Republican
Party and
populist elements within the Democratic Party itself.” Id.
While there are parallels between voter suppression based on race and voter suppression
based on DMC, it should also be noted the possibility of intersectionality as it pertains to
disenfranchisement. Individuals who identify as two or more races have the highest
prevalence of having any mental illness among adults in the United States. NAT’L INST.
MENTAL HEALTH, supra note 33. Thus, the treatment or detainment of people of color for
mental health purposes is not something this Article addresses but would be worth analyzing
in order to establish more context for voting rights issues. Disparities in mental health
diagnoses could point to overarching systemic racism that ultimately impacts one’s ability to
participate in the electorate, not dissimilar to mass incarceration, though more research is
needed.
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C. Attitudinal Barriers in Practice
The rationales discussed above manifest as attitudinal barriers that
further prevent people with DMC from voting. These barriers occur when
society fails to accommodate people with DMC and curbs voter
participation, even in situations where people with DMC would be legally
permitted to do so. Limiting physical access to voting evidences attitudinal
barriers permitting disadvantages in the voting process, and most
significantly, people acting as informal gatekeepers. 152
Physically getting to a polling place can be difficult for those with DMC.
Oftentimes, people with DMC require transportation assistance and once
at a polling place, the location might not accommodate wheelchairs or other
mobility devices that people with DMC sometimes use. 153 Relying on others
for transportation could prove difficult especially for those with DMC who
are hospitalized or in group home settings. 154 Furthermore, being in a
provider-managed group home could restrict physical access to things
people with DMC would need for registration purposes, such as state
identification, birth certificates, or utility bills. 155
Regarding disadvantages in the voting process, a 2012 study found that
half of voters with intellectual developmental disorders reported difficulties
at the polling place. 156 While polling places might not always be physically
accessible, there is also the need for more accessible materials. Voters with
DMC often have difficulty understanding ballots or voting machines 157 and
would benefit from a superficial change, such as including the pictures of
candidates. 158
Finally, informal gatekeepers may take it upon themselves to bar
people with DMC from voting. Because people with DMC often rely on
others to assist in activities of daily living, 159 there are opportunities for those
people to either encourage and facilitate voting or to discourage and prevent
voting. 160 People who provide services to those with DMC sometimes share
See Friedman, supra note 34, at 6–7 (describing how attitudinal barriers “played a role in
the voting process of the participants in the 2016 general election”).
Id. at 2.
Okwerekwu et al., supra note 23, at 519 (explaining the role support staff at these locations
can have in helping facilitate access to the polls).
Friedman, supra note 34, at 6.
Id. at 2 (citing to LISA SCHUR, MEERA ADYA & DOUGLAS KRUSE, DISABILITY, VOTER
TURNOUT, AND VOTING DIFFICULTIES IN THE 2012 ELECTIONS (2013)).
152

153
154

155
156

157

Id.

Karlawish, supra note 3, at 1348. “[S]uch a change might be particularly useful for persons
with mild to severe Alzheimer disease, who are better able to recognize pictures of the
candidates in the US presidential election than to identify the candidates based on free
recall.” Id.
Hoerner, supra note 20, at 115.
Friedman, supra note 34, at 8 (finding in their study that the biggest roadblock to voting
for individuals with intellectual developmental disabilities was the attitudes of individuals and
institutions around them).

158

159
160

675

676

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:2

a belief that it is legally permissible for them to prevent people with DMC
from voting. 161 While staff at long-term care facilities are required to respect
residents’ voting rights due to federal regulations, there is little guidance on
what the standard is and if the standard is not met, how people with DMC
can participate despite the barrier. 162 For example, in 2008, the staff at a
Philadelphia nursing home did not allow people with cognitive impairments
to vote unless they could name candidates or current office holders and
describe voting procedures, even though there are no mental capacity
restrictions under Pennsylvania law. 163
Further, poll workers and election officials have prevented people with
DMC from voting by “imposing their own voter competence
requirements.” 164 This occurs when election officials refuse to let people
vote, obtain absentee ballots, or receive voting assistance. 165 Election officials
and poll workers have sometimes required people with DMC to “take
examinations” and thus improperly bar them from voting based on their
own judgments. 166 Another gatekeeping strategy that was used occurred
shortly before the 2004 election when political party officials in Ohio were
“training thousands of recruits to challenge voters suspected of being
ineligible to vote” and were “taught how to challenge mentally disabled
voters who [were] assisted by anyone other than their legal guardians.” 167
Gatekeeping contributes to the societal narrative that people with DMC
should be prevented from voting and raises concerns for the ways a person
with DMC may vote.

D. Rationales Debunked
A common misconception is that individuals with DMC are not
capable of casting an adequate vote on their own behalf. 168 This
misconception stems from paternalistic beliefs that people with DMC
BAZELON, supra note 61, at 17.
Hoerner, supra note 20, at 115–16. “This means that if caregivers decline or fail to provide
assistance in spite of an individual’s request, there is no inviolable or invocable right that the
individual with a mental disability can call upon to demand participation in the federal
electoral process.” Id. at 116.
BAZELON, supra note 61, at 16. Bazelon notes two other examples that occurred prior to
the 2004 election, which include a California nursing home refusing to allow volunteers to
educate residents on registration requirements and a staff member at an Ohio nursing home
barring a resident from registering to vote due to only being able to sign using an “X” instead
of his full signature. Id.
Id. at 15.
Id. at 15–16.
Id. at 15. However, when challenged in the courts, those actions are deemed
unconstitutional. See id.
Id. at 22 (citing Michael Moss, Big G.O.P. Bid to Challenge Voters in Key State, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 23, 2004), https://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/23/politics/campaign/big-gop-bidto-challenge-voters-at-polls-in-key-state.html [https://perma.cc/AX2M-MGHC]).
Brescia, supra note 115, at 946.
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cannot be trusted to vote in their own best interest, but many individuals
with DMC who require assistance to care for themselves can still make
decisions and understand concepts. 169 In fact, a study found that people with
DMC recognize the impact their elected representative has on the issues
they care about and use that in making determinations on who to vote for. 170
Additionally, there is the issue of holding people with DMC to the
unnecessary standard of “rationality” to vote. This is especially true when
many people are presumed mentally capable of voting despite making what
could be viewed as “irrational” decisions at the ballot box, yet their right to
vote is respected. 171 DMC voters should not be held to a higher standard if
those with presumed capacity are not held to the same rationale.
Concerning fraud or undue influence, there is no data to support the
claim that people with DMC would be more susceptible to undue influence
than the average voter. 172 Voters are routinely bombarded with op-eds, social
media posts, or conversations attempting to influence them to vote in a
particular way. 173 People with DMC should not be singled out and
disenfranchised when other groups are just as likely to receive
impermissible influence with regard to voting. 174 Moreover, attempts to
measure votes that may be “unduly influenced by family members, wellmeaning friends, or even strangers with partisan agendas present[] a massive
black hole of zero data at worst, and anecdata at best.” 175
Meanwhile, other methods prevent fraud. Studies show that providing
systematic instruction to people with DMC could lessen impermissible
influence. 176 Additionally, there are already laws in place that seek to prevent
fraud that applies to everyone, including anti-fraud and anti-bribery laws. 177
However, studies show that voter fraud is actually rare and “not a
widespread phenomenon.” 178 Thus, preventing fraud is not an issue that
necessarily needs to be addressed, and some argue that even if there is a
fraudulent vote cast, disenfranchising an entire group of people would

169

Id. at 959.

Friedman, supra note 34, at 8. “Many discussed key issues such as services and supports,
domestic violence, and international relations as factors that determined who they voted for
in the 2016 presidential election.” Id.
Karlawish et al., supra note 3, at 1346.
Leonard, supra note 19.
Kopel, supra note 18, at 232 (emphasizing that people are not suggesting that these types
of practices give unfair advantages to the persuader).
Bindel, supra note 51, at 122.
Doraisamy, supra note 59, at 144 (emphasizing the difficulty in distinguishing what would
be impermissible or undue influence on another person and what is allowed with regard to
persuading someone to vote a certain way).
Agran et al., supra note 1, at 389.
Schriner & Ochs, supra note 68, at 5.
Doraisamy, supra note 59, at 142.
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simply be penalizing those who were victimized. 179
Along those lines, if the danger of fraud is minuscule, then it can be
inferred that the threat of illegitimate elections also does not warrant the
continued disenfranchisement of those with DMC. The harm in allowing
those “marginally incapable people to vote is small compared to the harm
of preventing capable people from exercising their fundamental right to
vote.” 180 Additionally, scholars state that there is no evidence that suggests
that allowing those with DMC to vote negatively impacts the quality of
elections. 181 Further, evidence suggests that those who are presumed to be
mentally competent to vote often fail to take the task seriously 182 and thus
would just as likely produce illegitimate voting results. Therefore,
disenfranchisement seems unnecessary given the weak evidence supporting
legitimacy concerns.
Finally, there is the concern of those with DMC lacking the intelligence
to participate in the electorate. 183 But simply falling within the category of
being a person with DMC does not mean having reduced intelligence
levels. 184 Many studies support this finding that people with DMC can
intelligently participate in the political process. First, there is the previously
mentioned study from Germany that those with mental illness tend to vote
for the left-wing candidate. 185 The authors of this study concluded that this
preference showed that those with mental illness voted for the candidate
that they believed would represent their best interests being that they were
of low socioeconomic status. 186
Second, a Canadian study found that inpatient psychiatry patients had
high levels of political knowledge. 187 Other studies have found that people

Agran & Hughes, supra note 116, at 61 (noting that this type of rationalization is not used
in other contexts. For example, elderly individuals are still allowed phone plans even though
this group is more susceptible to scams conducted via their phone.).
Brescia, supra note 115, at 951 (citing to language used by the Supreme Court in Kramer
v. Union Free School District No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969) that stressed the importance of
preserving one’s right to vote).
Kopel, supra note 18, at 227–28 (pointing out evidence to the contrary, such as studies
showing psychiatric patients mirroring votes of the general public based on class and studies
showing those with presumed capacity voting based on emotional or irrational factors).
Id. at 228.
Brescia, supra note 115, at 959.
Id. “While some severe mental disabilities can inhibit individuals from making basic
decisions or comprehension, by no means do the vast majority of people with mental
disabilities lose these functions.” Id.
Bhugra et al., supra note 28, at 398 (citing the study of Jens Bullenkamp & Burkhard
Voges, Voting Preferences of Outpatients with Chronic Mental Illness in Germany, 55
PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 1440 (2004)).
Id. and accompanying text.
Okwerekwu et al., supra note 23, at 516 (citing Jaychuk G, Manchanda R, Psychiatric
Patients and the Federal Election, 36 CAN. J. PSYCHIATRY,124 (1991) (finding that the laws
restricting voting rights were thereby unnecessary)).
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with DMC can make “reasoned judgments about political issues,” 188 and
their voting patterns often mirror that of the general public who share the
same socioeconomic status. 189 Given this evidence, it seems that stigma and
societal attitudes play a large role in preventing people with DMC from
voting. Thus, the prevalence of these counterarguments, supported by the
counterevidence, suggests that the continued exclusion of people with DMC
from their fundamental right to vote is unjustified.
VIII.

ISSUES WITH MEASURING CAPACITY

Even ignoring the weak rationales that support disenfranchising people
with DMC, measuring capacity to vote, in itself, is fundamentally
problematic. Problems arise due to the similarity to literacy tests, the lack of
uniformity in applying tests that measure capacity to vote, and the arbitrary
results that appear to ensue. 190 This raises the question as to whether a
capacity metric should be employed in any circumstance.

A. Similarity to Literacy Tests
In the mid-1800s, literacy tests were adopted by Northern states “to
produce a more competent electorate and effectively weed out sizeable
numbers of poor immigrant voters.” 191 Southern states quickly adopted
literacy tests in an effort to suppress Black voters. 192 Moreover, literacy tests
methodically targeted people of low socioeconomic status and racial
minorities to the advantage of privileged classes of people. 193 Literacy tests
became a tool of disenfranchisement until abolished by the VRA of 1965. 194
The history of literacy tests in the United States “demonstrates that any
standard that probes more deeply into a person’s electoral understanding
carries with it an inherent risk of subjective and arbitrary application.” 195
Presumptions, or standards put in place to subject certain people to a test
that determines their capacity to vote, have a striking resemblance to the
literacy tests that systematically disenfranchised Black voters. 196 Additionally,
“voters who are not identified and labeled as cognitively disabled are not
188
189
190
191

Brescia, supra note 115, at 959.
Kopel, supra note 18, at 227–28.
Id. at 230.
Brescia, supra note 115, at 953–54 (citing Cristina M. Rodríguez, From Litigation,

Legislation: A Review of Brian Landsberg's Free at Last to Vote: The Alabama Origins of
the 1965 Voting Rights Act, 117 YALE L.J. 1132, 1142–43 (2008) (book review)).
Id. at 954.
Kopel, supra note 18, at 232.
192
193

Voting Rights Act of 1965, 52 U.S.C § 10101(c) (stating that literacy tests are allowed only
if the agency can show the relevance of such a requirement and that even in that case there
is a rebuttable presumption of literacy for anybody who has completed the sixth grade in an
English-speaking school in the United States or one of its territories).
Karlawish et al., supra note 3, at 1346.
Brescia, supra note 115, at 954.
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subject to any standards of competency to perform the act of voting.” 197
Thus, given the similarity to literacy tests that were abolished by the VRA, a
metric to measure capacity must not act as a guise for a revival of literacy
tests to once again benefit the privileged.

B. The Lack of Uniformity
As illustrated above, states across the country differ in their laws
regarding mental capacity to vote. Absent consistent competency criteria or
standardized words being used, “it is unclear that the fundamental right to
vote will be protected uniformly for all citizens.” 198 Moreover, states often do
not define their stated standard for capacity, 199 resulting in misinterpretation
given the varying context of mental capacity presentations. 200 In fact, “little
attention has been given in most jurisdictions to considering by what
standard a person’s voting capacity should be determined.” 201 Without clear
definitions and standards, interpretation and application will likely be
unpredictable 202 and more susceptible to “the subjective judgments made by
the relevant public officials. 203 For example, some states during guardianship
proceedings will require the person to be able to “provide the names of
various federal, state or local office holders, to explain the voting process,
and to explain their political views,” which are questions not asked of other
voters. 204
Additionally, another implication with the lack of uniformity across the
United States is that it further perpetuates the disenfranchisement of those
with DMC. The “patchwork” effect means that “challenges to these
restrictions must be highly individualized” and “conducted state-by-state,”
which limits the ability for widespread organization to advocate against the
various legislation that could be wrongly denying those with DMC the right
to vote. 205

C. Arbitrary Results
Generally, laws should be applied to avoid “arbitrary decisions in
Schiltz, supra note 99, at 130. “Targeting persons with intellectual disabilities for such
screening is arguably an appropriate object of enhanced scrutiny” in the effort of equal
protection. Id.
Bindel, supra note 51, at 96.
Doraisamy, supra note 59, at 148.
Bhugra et al., supra note 28, at 340.
Hurme & Appelbaum, supra note 31, at 961 (referencing that only four states attempt to
provide a standard within their statutes).
Beckman, supra note 24, at 224.
Id. at 222 (emphasizing the risks involved when norms are relied on instead of standards
and procedures).
BAZELON, supra note 61, at 19.
Doraisamy, supra note 59, at 139 (noting the organizational impact of nationwide
campaigns).
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individual cases.” 206 There “is no scientifically determinable point” along the
scope of capacity “at which we can say that the person manifests sufficient
capacity for the task” at hand. 207 Moreover, “people who successfully
demonstrate capacity are presumptively competent to vote, while those who
do not may be excluded” unnecessarily. 208 Denying the right to vote from
those with capacity thereby produces arbitrary results in various
jurisdictions. Additionally, establishing a point of capacity where one is able
to vote is also arbitrary when there are individuals with presumed capacity
to vote who are not subject to a capacity measurement.

D. Should Capacity be Measured?
Given that measuring capacity can have risks, such as being similar to
a literacy test, lacking uniformity, and producing arbitrary results, it begs the
question of whether its risks outweigh its rewards. If there are not any
limitations related to mental capacity on the right to vote, there would be an
increase in votes by those without capacity, but simultaneously, there would
be no one wrongly denied their fundamental right to vote, thereby “erring
on the side of generosity.” 209 However, even when people without capacity
are voting, the consequences are minimal. In states without a mental
capacity voter requirement, there is no data that suggests their elections are
jeopardized due to people with DMC voting. 210 A “single incompetently cast
ballot is not likely to affect the course of an election, and even a larger
number of such ballots, assuming that the errors they reflect are distributed
randomly, are unlikely to have a substantial impact.” 211
Alternatively, it is argued that, because there are “standardized
instruments . . . developed to assess a person’s capacity to consent to
treatment,” there should be “a similar instrument to assess capacity to
vote.” 212 However, given the high importance of voting rights and the fact
that all other rights inherently flow from them, many argue that if a state
must impose a capacity test, it should favor more people voting than less

Beckman, supra note 24, at 223–24. It is worth repeating that people with DMC may have
a wide range of diagnoses that covers a spectrum of presentations or manifestation.
Hurme & Appelbaum, supra note 31, at 962. “Essentially, this is a determination regarding
allocation of the risk of error.” Id.
Kopel, supra note 18, at 232.
Beckman, supra note 24, at 231 (while also noting that “to err due to generosity is still to
err”).
BAZELON, supra note 61, at 19.
Hurme & Appelbaum, supra note 31, at 964. “Hence, even if the well-being of the person
casting an incompetent vote would be better served by the candidate for whom he or she
would have voted if competent, but by virtue of incompetence did not, the likelihood that
the incompetently cast ballot will affect the outcome of the election, and thus harm the
person in a material way, is slight.” Id.
Karlawish et al., supra note 3, at 1346–47.
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and be determined on an individual basis. 213
IX.

PROPOSED SOLUTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. The American Bar Association’s Recommendation
The American Bar Association (“ABA”) proposed a solution to this
issue in 2007, in which it recommended that a state court should only take
away a person’s right to vote due to mental incapacity if:
(1) [t]he exclusion is based on a determination by a court of
competent jurisdiction; (2) [a]ppropritate due process protections
have been afforded; (3) [t]he court finds that the person cannot
communicate, with or without accommodations, a specific desire
to participate in the voting process; and (4) [t]he findings are
established by clear and convincing evidence. 214
The ABA’s recommendation aims to prevent the issue of unqualified
third parties from imposing those attitudinal barriers and not allowing
people with DMC to vote based on “societal prejudice and
misconceptions.” 215 Additionally, it appears the ABA is attempting to create
uniformity in the way capacity can be assessed by the courts.
But the ABA’s model is not without weaknesses. Requiring a voter to
communicate a “specific desire” to vote is “arbitrary” considering “so many
eligible voters choose not to vote.” 216 Additionally, it would be difficult to
differentiate “between a capable voter who has no desire to vote but has the
right to do so, and an incapable voter who has no desire to vote but does
not have the right to do so.” 217 This argument reflects that the choice to
withhold one’s vote can be a form of expression and that those with DMC
should not be held to a different standard, especially when many people
with presumed capacity vote “irrationally.” 218 Additionally, implementing
this model would likely burden courts, and the risk of judicial discretion
being used differently across jurisdictions still exists.
As addressed below, the ABA’s model should be utilized by states that
See Hurme & Appelbaum, supra note 31, at 932 (advocating for capacity limitations to be
“narrowly circumscribed” and avoid “categorical exclusions”); see also Kopel, supra note 18,
at 235 (arguing for a “functional capacity standard” but one that can “be easily met”).
AM. BAR ASS’N, RECOMMENDATION AND REPORT OF THE SYMPOSIUM: FACILITATING
VOTING AS PEOPLE AGE: IMPLICATIONS OF COGNITIVE IMPAIRMENT (2007),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/directories/policy/2007_am_121.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9W59-72M5].
Brescia, supra note 115, at 963. Unqualified third parties could include “partisan poll
workers or local election officials.” Id.
Doraisamy, supra note 59, at 149.
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opt for voting restrictions based on mental capacity. Apart from the third
criterion, the ABA’s model would likely be the most successful as it keeps
determinations to a neutral decision-maker, applies legal standards of due
process and an evidentiary burden on the party challenging capacity, and
does not require Congress to mandate a federal standard.

B. The Doe Standard
Doe v. Rowe, Maine’s constitutional provision that disenfranchised
those with mental illness who were “under guardianship,” was struck down
for violating the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 219 Additionally, the statute that implemented
Maine’s constitutional provision was also struck down for violating the ADA
and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. 220 Maine’s district court found
that the laws were not narrowly tailored because mental illness was
interpreted broadly to include those capable to vote, and not every
individual without capacity to vote is under guardianship. 221 After Doe,
“restrictions that arbitrarily distinguish” between categories of people’s
capacity are subject to challenges on Equal Protection grounds. 222
Doe suggested a uniform standard for evaluating capacity for voting.
Under the Doe standard, a court determines on an individual basis whether
the person is “(1) understanding the process and (2) understanding the effect
of the vote.” 223 The Doe standard is meant to “protect the integrity of voting”
while ensuring that those who are capable of voting are able to do so. 224
However, the Doe standard is criticized for not being specific enough about
what would “pass” this standard and where the line for capacity should be
before a court takes away this fundamental right for an individual. 225 This
proposed solution is therefore not recommended due to its vague language
that would likely continue to perpetuate arbitrary results if applied. 226
C. The Competency Assessment Tool for Voting (CAT-V)
The Competency Assessment Tool for Voting (“CAT-V”) was based
off of the Doe holding. 227 The CAT-V is a structured interview “designed to
address the subject’s understanding of the nature of voting, the effects of
voting and the capacity to make a choice.” 228 Research regarding the CAT219

Doe v. Rowe, 156 F. Supp. 2d 35, 59 (D. Me. 2001).

220

Id.
Id. at 55–56.
Doraisamy, supra note 59, at 147.
Hoerner, supra note 20, at 126.
Okwerekwu et al., supra note 23, at 516.
Hoerner, supra note 20, at 126.
Id.
Okwerekwu et al., supra note 23, at 516.
Beckman, supra note 24, at 229.
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V instrument found that the results suggest “correlation is weak between
cognitive status and capacity to vote,” 229 and thus “status-based
disenfranchisement provisions are too broad.” 230 In other words, legislation
is likely excluding more people than necessary from their right to vote.
The developers of CAT-V recommended that the instrument “should
only be considered in exceptional circumstances as a guide when the
person’s capacity to vote is called into question.” 231 Further, the developers
believed CAT-V would be most useful in “long-term care facilities as a
trigger for referral to a neutral decision-maker.” 232 Thus, if a third party
suspects a person lacks capacity to vote, CAT-V should be used to
determine whether their voting rights should be legally challenged.
However, only administering the CAT-V to certain categories of individuals
would be vulnerable to the risks addressed above similar to literacy tests or
challenged on Equal Protection grounds.
Other critiques of this proposed solution stem from the way in which
the CAT-V is scored. 233 The score ranges from zero to six, with six
demonstrating high capacity to vote and zero demonstrating no capacity to
vote. 234 The developers “did not take the position that any particular score .
. . represents minimum capacity for voting.” 235 Accordingly, when a subject
receives an intermediate score, discretionary judgments still need to be
made. 236 This discretion leaves open the possibility for certain groups of
people with DMC to be subject to discrimination resulting in attitudinal
barriers as previously mentioned. For those reasons, the CAT-V is not
recommended as a capacity metric.

D. Suggested Congressional Legislation
Some scholars argue that Congress should pass legislation to protect
the right to vote for those with DMC because “[o]nce states have
Id. at 230. “Recorded cognitive ability turns out be a poor predictor of capacity to vote, as
measured by the ability to choose and to understanding the nature of elections.” Id. (citing
Pietro Tiraboschi, Erica Chitò, Leonardo Sacco, Marta Sala, Stefano Stefanini & Carlo
Alberto Defanti, Evaluating Voting Competence in Persons with Alzheimer Disease, 2011
INT’L J. ALZHEIMER’S DISEASE 1, 1–6 (2011)).
Kopel, supra note 18, at 236–37.
Lawn et al., supra note 49, at 294. “They also suggest that we would be safe to presume
capacity, given that their study confirmed that even persons with serious mental illness are
capable of voting.” Id.
Doraisamy, supra note 59, at 150.
Id. “The simplicity of the CAT-V questions and potential scores is a double-edged sword.”
229

230
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Id.
Paul S. Appelbaum, Richard J. Bonnie & Jason H. Karlawish, The Capacity to Vote of
Persons with Alzheimer’s Disease, 162 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 2094, 2098 (2005).
Kopel, supra note 18, at 236. “Instead, they caution against drawing a firm capacity line
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among the possible scores and suggest that different decision-makers may use CAT-V data
differently.” Id.
Hurme & Appelbaum, supra note 31, at 970.
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disenfranchised persons with diminished mental capacities, they are
reluctant to reverse course and enfranchise them later absent judicial
intervention.” 237 Moreover, it is difficult to amend state constitutions, and
there is “a lack of widespread popular and legislative support for altering
statutory provisions.” 238 Additionally, as previously discussed, the
jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction differences make it difficult to mobilize the
general public around this issue of disenfranchisement for people with
DMC.
Even though states generally have the authority to regulate elections,
Congress may be able to “frame a uniform mental competency standard as
a manner in which a qualification is determined.” 239 Creating uniformity in
standards and definitions that would “preempt all state disenfranchisement
definitions” not consistent with federal legislation 240 has been argued to be a
step in the right direction to protect the right to vote for those with DMC
and possibly restore their franchise. 241 Federal uniformity could ensure that
states are not defining capacity in a way that limits more people with DMC
from voting than necessary to serve its rationales.
However, congressional legislation could be counterintuitive, as setting
a federal standard might galvanize disenfranchisement in states that
currently have no mental capacity restrictions on the right to vote. There is
concern among scholars that universal capacity measures “would be taken
too seriously and result in the disenfranchisement of people who are now
permitted to vote.” 242 Therefore, because this proposal risks more
widespread disenfranchisement for those with DMC, it is not
recommended.

E. Non-Legislative Measures
The suggested, non-legislative measures mainly address the attitudinal
barriers that result in the disenfranchisement of those with DMC. One
proposition is to provide more information for election officials about what
the law is in their jurisdiction and what is permissible regarding the voting
rights of people with DMC. 243 Caregivers and guardians of those with DMC
are another target for education in order to help them understand the
importance and benefits in allowing those with DMC to participate in the
Bindel, supra note 51, at 92–93 (alluding to the procedural barriers states may have in
amending their constitutions).
Id. at 88.
Doraisamy, supra note 59, at 151 (referring to U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4 (granting Congress
power to regulate “times, places and manner” of holding federal elections)).
Hoerner, supra note 20, at 124.
Doraisamy, supra note 59, at 151.
Kopel, supra note 18, at 239. For example, states that currently have no laws
disenfranchising people with DMC might follow the path laid out by Congress and adopt
state legislation limiting voting to those with “capacity” as defined by Congress.
Karlawish et al., supra note 3, at 1348.
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voting process. 244 Thus, with education and awareness surrounding this
issue, the public at large can take methods to encourage those with DMC to
vote, thereby normalizing their participation in society.
There are other initiatives that make the process of voting more
accessible for those with DMC. Oftentimes, people with DMC “may have
difficulty understanding ballots or voting machines,” thus making
adjustments could increase their ability to casts votes. 245 Additionally,
providing pictures of candidates would be particularly helpful for people
whose DMC stems from dementia and struggle with free recall. 246

F. Recommendation
Given the scope of disenfranchisement for individuals with DMC and
the state legislation that enables it, some action must be taken to protect, or
reinstate, the right to vote for this marginalized group.
Ideally, states should amend their constitutions and laws to remove all
restrictions based on mental incapacity. As previously addressed, the
rationales for disenfranchisement are weak and the consequences for
allowing those who “lack capacity” to vote are minimal, especially when
fraud laws act as a precautionary measure to deter improper behavior. 247
Moreover, a number of states already practice this, which arguably
demonstrates the needlessness of mental capacity disenfranchisement laws
elsewhere.
However, given the difficulty in passing constitutional amendments,
the “lack of public support for repealing disenfranchising laws,” 248 and the
pervasiveness of stigma surrounding those with DMC, a combination of
judicial intervention and non-legislative measures is more plausible.
Congressional legislation again is not appropriate as it could be
counterproductive. Legislation in this area would be highly political, which
could draw more negative attention to the issue, all while having a small
likelihood of successful passage.
Therefore, the best course of action would be to impose the ABA’s
recommendation for courts across the country to apply without the third
criterion of requiring a person to express a “specific desire” to vote. 249
Providing a standardized judicial process that only disenfranchises a person
with DMC in individualized circumstances would provide protections for
Kopel, supra note 18, at 231 (emphasizing collective action in providing people with
opportunities who may lack necessary resources that underlies a democratic society).
Friedman, supra note 34, at 2 (advocating for the need for more accessible materials to
assist voting).
Karlawish et al., supra note 3, at 1348.
See supra Section VII.B.
Schiltz, supra note 99, at 114. “[P]erhaps because, by definition, the affected parties are
not able to reward these candidates with their vote.” Id.
See supra Section IX.A.
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people with DMC as a group. Further, providing the evidentiary standard
of clear and convincing evidence placed on the proponent of
disenfranchisement is likely a reasonable threshold to protect the voting
rights of those with DMC.
In addition, providing education about the relevant law and making the
voting process simpler for those with DMC are initiatives that can be
introduced immediately. Allowing those with DMC to participate in the
electorate would decrease stigma and increase democracy by the inclusion
of this voting bloc. Encouraging people to exercise their right to vote should
be done regardless of perceived capacity.
X.

CONCLUSION

In sum, people with DMC constitute a large portion of the United
States through a wide variety of diagnoses, which includes a spectrum of
presentations that may, at some point, deem them ‘incapable’ of voting. 250
States are legally allowed to disenfranchise people based on mental
incapacity, but standards vary depending on the jurisdiction, which results
in some people with DMC being denied voting rights while others are not. 251
Even where legal restrictions are not in place, attitudinal barriers stemming
from prejudice and unjustified rationales prevent people with DMC from
exercising their fundamental right to vote. 252
Implementing a capacity metric for those with DMC comes with
inherent risks. 253 Ideally, states should amend their constitutions and statutes
to remove voting restrictions based on mental incapacity. 254 Realistically, for
states that wish to continue implementing voting restrictions based on
mental incapacity, they should implement the ABA’s recommendation
absent the third criterion. 255 This method would serve to create uniform
standards implemented by the judiciary and deter informal gatekeeping. 256
Finally, mobilization and advocacy through education and non-legislative
initiatives should occur to promote enfranchisement and encourage those
with DMC to vote, thereby cementing their inclusion in society and
dismantling the continuation of stigma. 257
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Leonard, supra note 19.
See supra Part V.
See supra Section VII.C.
See supra Part VIII.
See supra Section IX.F.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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